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BENEFIT EXPENSES: HOW THE BENEFIT 
CORPORATION’S SOCIAL PURPOSE CHANGES 
THE ORDINARY AND NECESSARY 
ABSTRACT 
The recent spread of Benefit Corporations formally challenges the 
assumption that for-profit companies are strictly profit maximizing en-
tities. Businesses can now incorporate under charitable business purposes 
that were once restricted to 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations. While 
incorporating under a charitable purpose is no longer restricted to only 
non-profit entities, Benefit Corporations are not able to receive the same 
income tax exemption under the Internal Revenue Code. While for-profit en-
tities do receive some tax benefits for their charitable behavior, such as the 
charitable donation deduction, the current tax structure does not provide 
an equal amount of tax benefits for charitable behavior when performed 
by a Benefit Corporation as it does for a 501(c)(3). This Note argues that 
the Internal Revenue Code’s entity classification for non-profits and for-
profits does not accommodate the mixed-purpose structure of the Benefit 
Corporation. This Note will explore the Internal Revenue Code’s treat-
ment of non-profit 501(c)(3)s and charitable behavior by for-profit entities 
and posits that the Internal Revenue Code attempts to treat the charitable 
behavior of an entity favorably more than it attempts to treat an entity as a 
whole favorably. Because charitable behavior is not considered a trade or 
business under the Internal Revenue Code, Benefit Corporations will now 
be regularly engaging in charitable behavior, the expense of which will 
not be categorized as either a charitable deduction or as ordinary and nec-
essary business expenses. This Note suggests that a possible way to give 
Benefit Corporations the same tax treatment for its charitable behavior as 
non-profits engaging in the same behavior is to create a “Benefit Expense” 
deduction akin to the ordinary and necessary business expense deduction 
currently available to for-profit entities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the business community’s interest in social responsibil-
ity has grown.1 Many for-profit businesses have adopted Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) efforts and departments.2 Other businesses seek to 
incorporate socially responsible behavior into their entire business struc-
ture so that social responsibility is part of the core business operations.3 
Many of these businesses find themselves in the emerging fourth sector. 
The fourth sector hosts various hybrids of the existing three sectors: private 
(for-profit), social (non-profit/NGOs) and public (government).4 These new 
businesses are shifting away from the assumption in corporate law that the 
only purpose a business can have is to generate profit.5 These new busi-
nesses are redefining their business purpose to include both generating 
profits and generating benefit for the greater public good.6 
One of the most recent business forms to enter into the fourth sector is 
the benefit corporation.7 The benefit corporation was created primarily to 
address concerns of corporate responsibility, transparency, and accounta-
bility.8 A benefit corporation shifts from the traditional shareholder model 
of profit-maximization to a stakeholder model, allowing corporations to 
act in furtherance of broader social concerns.9 Under the stakeholder model 
                                                 
1 Cassady V. Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors 
(A/K/A “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 679 (2012); William H. 
Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose 
of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 819–24 (2012); Robert A. 
Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 60 (2010). 
2 Michael R. Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation, Version 1.0—A Breakthrough 
in Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047, 1057–58 (2011). 
3 Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 59, 62. 
4 HEERAD SABETI, FOURTH SECTOR NETWORK CONCEPT WORKING GROUP, THE 
EMERGING FOURTH SECTOR, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (The Aspen Inst., 2009), available 
at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/emerging-fourth-sector-executive-summary. 
5 Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 819. 
6 Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance 
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 
170, 170 (2012). 
7 What Is a B Corp?, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/about (accessed by searching 
the Internet Archive index for Oct. 14, 2012). 
8 Business FAQ’s, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/for-business/business 
-faqs (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (“A benefit corporation is a new class of corporation that vol-
untarily meets higher standards of corporate purpose, accountability, and transparency.”). 
9 See generally Clark & Babson, supra note 1; Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The 
Case for For-Profit Charities, 5 (The Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 304, 2006), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu 
/files/files/304.pdf; Alissa Mickels, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling 
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of business purpose, when a corporation makes a decision, it takes more 
than just its shareholders into account; it also considers the impact on, and 
interests of, its employees, customers, investors, supply chain, the envi-
ronment, communities, and more.10 Benefit corporations have been codi-
fied by the legislature of twelve states,11 and other states are contemplating 
passing the same or similar legislation.12 This legislation creates an entirely 
new choice of entity in states that have enacted the legislation.13 
The goal of the fourth sector is to create a business structure that lends 
itself well to serving two purposes: making profit and doing good.14 One 
of the many challenges facing the fourth sector is that current corporate 
law requires for-profit organizations to act primarily in the financial interest 
of its shareholders and assumes and requires that corporations are profit-
maximizing entities.15 This is a legal problem.16 Fourth sector businesses 
                                                                                                                         
the Ideals of a For-Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and 
Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271 (2009). 
10 Munch, supra note 6, at 176–77. 
11 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-1 (2012); 
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1801 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch.156E (2012); MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01 (West 2011); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701-1709 (Consol. 
2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.02 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011); PA. 
H.B. 1616 (2012); 2012 S.C. Laws Act 277 (H.B. 4766) (West); see State by State Legislative 
Status, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
12 Legislation introduced in North Carolina, Michigan, Washington D.C., and Colorado. 
State by State Legislative Status, supra note 11. 
13 What Is a B Corp?, supra note 7. 
14 See generally Michael D. Gottesman, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal 
Road Forward for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
345 (2007); Janet Mahon, Joint Ventures Between Non-Profit and For-Profit Organizations 
St. David’s Case—Worthy Destination, but Road Under Construction, 56 TAX LAW. 845 
(2003); Thomas J. Billitteri, Mixing Mission and Business: Does Social Enterprise Need 
a New Legal Approach? Highlights from an Aspen Institute Roundtable (Aspen Inst., 
Working Paper, Jan. 2007), available at http://www.fourthsector.net/attachments/15/original 
/New_Legal_Forms_Report_FINAL.pdf?1229660976. 
15 Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 825–28 (“A business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to 
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction 
of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them 
to other purposes.” (quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919))); 
see also Ashley Schoenjahn, New Faces of Corporate Responsibility: Will New Entity 
Forms Allow Businesses to Do Good?, 37 J. CORP. L., 453, 454–57 (2012). 
16 Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 831–32 (“Without clear authority explicitly per-
mitting directors to pursue both profit and a company’s mission, [ ] directors of mission-
driven companies ... may be hesitant to ‘consider’ their missions for fear of a fiduciary 
duty breach.”). 
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want to do good, but corporate law, and the assumptions within corporate 
law, are set up for businesses whose goals are primarily, if not entirely, 
profit oriented.17 As creators of businesses challenge the concept that busi-
nesses are solely for-profit entities, and accept the view that businesses 
should, or can,18 “do good,” the laws governing these entities must shift as 
well. Fourth sector corporations looking to create actual social benefit 
must find a way to do so in a way that does not violate their duty to share-
holders and that allows for social impact to be put ahead of profits.19 Busi-
nesses looking to enter the fourth sector want to operate in a way such that 
they further social goals and such that un-likeminded investors or changes 
in ownership will not threaten their businesses’ social mission.20 Benefit 
corporations solve some of the challenges facing the fourth sector by elim-
inating the risk of liability for making decisions that benefit social and en-
vironmental purposes over the financial interests of shareholders.21 This 
helps to give benefit corporations protection under corporate law theories. 
The benefit corporation is not the only innovation in corporate struc-
turing that has been proposed to fix this fiduciary problem, but it is the 
first state-enacted legislation aimed at doing so for corporations.22 Some 
states have similarly adjusted laws for Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) 
and the 1996 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act allows LLCs to be 
organized for any legal purpose regardless of whether it is for profit.23 The 
                                                 
17 See LYNN A. STOUT, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE PURPOSE, 48 ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE 
STUD. 1 (June 2012). 
18 See generally Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (or Not) 
from Economics and Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 69 (2011). 
19 Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 465 (“One of the purposes of the B Corporation is to 
circumnavigate the shareholder primacy norm that keeps traditional corporations from 
pursuing social motives over profit maximization.”). 
20 See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 826–28 (discussing how the owners of craigslist 
wanted to create a rights plan to maintain the culture and “community service roots” but 
“the court noted that the adoption of the rights plan was not reasonably related to the pro-
motion of stockholder value,” and that the owners had “fail[ed] to prove that craigslist’s 
culture translates into increased profitability for stockholders.”); see also Schoenjahn, 
supra note 15, at 466 (suggesting that the classic example of Ben & Jerry’s having to sac-
rifice the company’s social culture to sell to the highest bidder could have been avoided if 
Ben & Jerry’s had been a Benefit Corporation); Deskins, supra note 2, at 1060–61 (also 
discussing the Ben & Jerry’s anecdote). 
21 See Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 458–59. 
22 See William H. Clark & Larry Vranka, The Need and Rationale for the Benefit Corpo-
ration: Why It Is the Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs, 
Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public, App. C, BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION CENTER, available 
at http://benefitcorp.net/for-attorneys/benefit-corp-white-paper (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
23 See David S. Walker, Consideration of an LLC for a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit Organization, 
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627 (2012); RULLCA § 104(b) (2006); see also Brewer, supra 
note 1, at 680. 
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flexibility of an LLC has led to the L3C, Limited Liability Low-Profit 
Company, which combines the legal structure of an LLC and the social 
mission of a non-profit.24 Other businesses achieve protection from this 
fiduciary duty liability through hybrid forms created by manipulating ex-
isting structures, or by working around these structures.25 As more busi-
ness entities allow purposes that are not profit-motivated, attention is 
drawn to what some say is an outdated assumption in corporate law.26 
Being a state-recognized entity is powerful for protecting against liabil-
ity for managers’ decisions, but proponents of the fourth sector see a second 
issue: taxation.27 Choice-of-entity decisions revolve around the two issues 
of liability and taxation. Choosing to become a benefit corporations is no 
exception.28 Because benefit corporations serve the same social purposes 
originally thought to be exclusively served by tax-exempt non-profits, the 
question becomes: should these entities enjoy the same tax exemptions as 
non-profits?29 Because benefit corporations are at least partially profit mo-
tivated, it is unlikely that benefit corporations will be granted the exact 
same tax-exempt status as 501(c)(3) non-profits.30 Rather than seeking 
preferential tax treatment on the entity level as an exempt organization, it 
may be more attainable for benefit corporations to receive preferential treat-
ment from the Internal Revenue Code (Code) for the activities carried out 
that liken them to non-profits.31 This preferential tax treatment would pos-
itively serve benefit corporations and incentivize social responsibility in 
businesses.32 This Note will suggest that the Code’s view of an entity’s 
status under the Code as non-profit or for-profit clouds the true color and 
correct nature of a for-profit’s activities, and that the Code’s failure to adjust 
its view of business purpose at the same pace as corporate theory, creates 
complications and contradictions within the Code. This Note will address 
how having a state-incorporated purpose to create a social benefit in addition 
to a purpose of profit generation potentially affects the tax treatment of ben-
efit corporations, because the Code determines its treatment of an entity’s 
                                                 
24 See Schoenjahn, supra note 15, 460–61. 
25 Brewer, supra note 1, at 685 (“It is possible ... to create a structure that makes use 
of multiple organizations acting in concert to achieve the goal of blending philanthropic 
and private dollars to fund a social enterprise.”). 
26 Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 825. 
27 Brewer, supra note 1, at 684. 
28 Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 458. 
29 Malani & Posner, supra note 9, at 10–11. 
30 Id. 
31 See generally Walker, supra note 23, at 646–49. 
32 Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 463 (discussing Bill Gates’s idea of a “creative cap-
italism” and how the prospect of profits could incentivize companies to do good). 
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individual transactions and activities with consideration of the entity’s 
purpose for those transactions. 
In some cases, the social benefit created by socially oriented businesses 
is similar, if not equivalent, to the social benefit created by 501(c)(3)s. 
501(c)(3)s are exempt from federal income tax because the purpose of the 
entity, and the purpose of the entity’s activities, is to create social bene-
fit.33 Although there is a hard line drawn between 501(c)(3)s and for-profit 
corporations at the entity level for classification purposes, the Code ulti-
mately looks at the behavior of the entity in light of its classification. The 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) treats the creation of social benefit, or “good 
behavior,” favorably throughout the Code and associated Regulations and, 
treats solely profit-motivated activities (even of tax-exempt entities) unfa-
vorably.34 The IRS closely considers the purpose of a business entity, along 
with the purpose of the business activity, when determining its tax treat-
ment.35 For the Code to remain consistent, benefit corporations should re-
ceive more favorable tax treatment for their socially beneficial activities 
than non-benefit corporations who engage in corporate philanthropy. 
I. SHIFT IN BUSINESS PURPOSE OF FOR-PROFITS 
Businesses are already operating in socially responsible ways. Some 
argue that the risks directors face by setting social objectives instead of 
pursuing profit maximization are existent but unenforceable.36 New forms 
of business, such as the benefit corporation, that want to change the pur-
pose for which they are organized face a greater degree of risk and third 
party expectation than for-profits participating in only occasional social 
activities.37 This is especially true as some consumers wish to require busi-
nesses to act responsibly, and are unsatisfied with the consolation that busi-
nesses are at least now allowed to act responsibly.38 With the increase of 
access to information, consumers are demanding more transparency from 
businesses and holding them accountable for their actions.39 Partly in re-
sponse to consumer pressures, and partly due to the aspirations of social 
entrepreneurs, the fourth sector “integrates social purposes with business 
methods ... [unified by] a motivation to make the world a better place.”40 
                                                 
33 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). 
34 See infra Part II.A. 
35 See infra Parts III, IV. 
36 Munch, supra note 6, at 177–78. 
37 Id. at 179. 
38 Deskins, supra note 2, at 1074. 
39 SABETI, supra note 4, at 1. 
40 Id. 
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The existing structures of each sector confine the functionality of busi-
nesses, and the fourth sector seeks to create a new space where an entity’s 
impact is not limited by existing law.41 Non-profits generally have limited 
access to capital, as they cannot conduct activity solely for creating profit.42 
For-profits have a duty to act in the financial interest of shareholders, and by 
definition are created to make a profit.43 This leaves those who would like 
both to make a profit and to do good in unclear territory with an unclear 
legal structure for their business. 
As well established in Dodge v. Ford44 and reinforced in Revlon,45 man-
agers could be found in breach of their fiduciary duties to shareholders if 
they chose to pursue social benefit in place of shareholder wealth maximi-
zation. Corporate law “has established profit-maximization as a default 
rule”46 and supports the notion that a corporation must act in the financial 
interest of its shareholders. This is a problem for the fourth sector which, 
at least sometimes, wishes to do the “right thing” rather than the most 
profitable thing. The directors and officers of a corporation that act against 
the financial interest of its shareholders are left vulnerable to shareholder 
lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty.47 Shareholder action is not the only 
vulnerability to which corporations are exposed if they desire to serve a 
social purpose. 
All corporations are required to declare an incorporated purpose in 
their articles of incorporation filed with their chosen state.48 For a non-
benefit corporation the incorporated purpose will most likely state a pur-
pose similar to “all legal ways of making a profit.”49 Taking money out of 
profits to give to charities goes against the listed incorporated purpose of a 
for-profit corporation.50 At one time, a corporation giving money to charity 
                                                 
41 Billitteri, supra note 14, at 2 (“This new generation of hybrid organizations is taking 
root in a fertile space between the corporate world, which is constrained by its duty to 
generate profits for shareholders, and the nonprofit world, which often lacks the market 
efficiencies of commercial enterprise.”). 
42 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c). 
43 Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 (2011). 
44 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
45 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(allowing consideration of non-shareholder constituency during hostile takeover, only 
where the constituency “rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders”). 
46 Gottesman, supra note 14, at 357. 
47 Mickels, supra note 9, at 282. 
48 See 1 CORP. FORMS § 2:1 (2012 ed.). 
49 See Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility 
into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631 (2009). 
50 See 2 FLETCHER CORP. FORMS § 8:18 (5th ed.). 
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was considered a breach of its contract with the state.51 Before Congress 
passed legislation allowing tax deductions for charitable donations, charita-
ble giving was considered ultra vires, and even remained ultra vires in many 
states after the federal legislation was passed.52 While this is no longer the 
case and a corporation can now freely donate to charities without violating 
its incorporated purpose (subject to a ten percent limitation),53 charitable 
giving is an exception, not a relaxing, of the treatment of fiduciary duty. 
Corporate law views profit making, and the distribution of those profits, as 
the primary purpose of a corporation.54 By passing legislation, charitable 
donations are no longer ultra vires, but other behavior that lessens a corpo-
ration’s profits risks being categorized as a breach of fiduciary duty or 
break of promise with the state. 
By passing benefit corporation legislation, the fourth sector seeks to 
legalize a second and equal incorporated purpose of a business in addition 
to profit making: the creation of social benefit.55 Benefit corporation legis-
lation aims to legalize the “stakeholder” model for corporations, which will 
in turn affect the legal standards for fiduciary duty and state-incorporate 
purpose inquiries.56 At the heart of the “stakeholder” model is the desire to 
expand the duty of a corporation beyond shareholders to individuals, com-
munities, and entities that are impacted, and to expand the actions of cor-
porations beyond purely profit generating actions.57 As mentioned briefly 
before, there have been a number of forms that businesses and advocates 
have chosen as possible model forms for achieving social purpose goals 
and solving issues of fiduciary duty.58 Some suggest resolving this chal-
lenge by choosing other entity structures, such as LLCs, that have more 
flexible and alternative default rules;59 hybrid business forms, such as the 
Low-Profit Limited Liability Corporation (L3C);60 or joint operations of 
for- and non-profits.61 
                                                 
51 See 1 CORP. FORMS § 10:61 (2012 ed.). 
52 Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate 
Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835, 857 (1997); see also Nancy J. Knauer, The 
Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the 
Social Construction of the Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 8 (1994). 
53 26 U.S.C. § 170. 
54 See Choudhury, supra note 49, at 635. 
55 Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 460. 
56 See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
57 Gottesman, supra note 14, at 357; see also Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 59, 62. 
58 See supra Introduction. 
59 See generally Walker, supra note 23. 
60 Brewer, supra note 1, at 681–82. 
61 See Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 459–60. 
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Another option is to contract around the default rules, most commonly 
by constituency statutes.62 Constituency statutes are allowed and recog-
nized in just over half of the states,63 and they permit corporations to add 
stakeholder interests to their articles of incorporation.64 This allows the 
corporation to serve a social purpose in addition to a profit-maximizing 
purpose and would eliminate the problem of socially motivated activities 
being considered ultra vires. However, the extent to which constituency 
statements allow for a true stakeholder model is not without criticism. For 
one, constituency statements only make it permissible to act for a non-
profit-maximizing purpose, they do not require a company to do good.65 
Another criticism is that some constituency statements narrowly define 
stakeholders only as the immediately surrounding parties such as employees 
and customers but leave out larger stakeholders such as “the environment, 
the international community, or human rights.”66 Another criticism is that 
even though these constituency statutes allow the stakeholder interests to 
be added to the articles of incorporation, there has been no court ruling on 
whether the constituency statutes can be legally enforced.67 Case law has 
disallowed “commitments beyond profit maximization” when the purposes 
have not been added to the articles of incorporation, but there is no ruling 
that considers when they have been added.68 Essentially, constituency stat-
utes allow organizations to state their purpose, but it is still legally uncertain 
that corporations are able to carry it out.69 
Benefit corporation legislation improves upon many of the inadequa-
cies of constituency statutes. While the legislation in each of these states 
varies slightly,70 the legal framework of each state is greatly influenced by 
the legal framework given by B Lab: 
                                                 
62 See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 357; see also Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 92; 
see generally Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 828–34; Munch, supra note 6, at 180–83. 
63 See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 830–31 nn.64–66 and accompanying text. 
Notably, of the states that have passed benefit corporation legislation, California is the 
only state not to have recognized constituency statutes prior to passing the benefit corpo-
ration legislation. Id. at 818 n.1, 830 n.64. 
64 See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 357. 
65 Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 832 (“[D]irectors have the permission not to 
consider interests other than shareholder maximization of value.”). 
66 Munch, supra note 6, at 181. 
67 See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 357. 
68 Id. at 356–57. 
69 Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 831–32 (“Without clear authority ... even directors 
of mission-driven companies in constituency statute jurisdictions may be hesitant to ‘consider’ 
their missions for fear of a fiduciary duty breach.”). See Legal FAQs, BENEFIT CORP 
INFO. CTR., http://www.benefitcorp.net/for-attorneys/legal-faqs (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
70 See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 838. 
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Objective: Expand the responsibilities of the corporation to include con-
sideration of the interests of employees, consumers, the community, and 
the environment. Give legal permission and protection to officers and 
directors to consider all stakeholders, not just shareholders. Create ad-
ditional rights for shareholders to hold directors and officers account-
able to these interests. Limit these expanded rights to shareholders 
exclusively—non-shareholders are explicitly not empowered with a 
new right of action.71 
Benefit corporations are a clear improvement upon constituency state-
ments if the main concern is requiring businesses to act responsibly, as 
benefit corporations are not just permitted, but required to serve a social 
purpose.72 Benefit corporation legislation also expands the stakeholders 
whose interests the corporation can consider by requiring benefit corpora-
tions to include a general public benefit as an incorporated purpose, and 
by allowing for a specific public benefit.73 
The goal of benefit corporations is to solve the fiduciary duty problem 
in the simplest way possible. Two aspects are important to finding a simple 
solution. The first is including the stakeholder model in its articles of in-
corporation74 and the second is making the entity legitimate under the state 
law by passing legislation that recognizes this distinct entity’s ability to 
include the stakeholder model in its articles.75 This is an important distinc-
tion and can be demonstrated by examining the difference between benefit 
corporations created by state legislation and Certified B Corps certified by 
B Labs.76 In many ways, Certified B Corps function like extreme constitu-
ency statements.77 A B Corp’s articles of incorporation may be identical to 
                                                 
71 The Legal Framework, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become/legal (accessed 
by searching the Internet Archive index for Oct. 3, 2012). 
72 See Guidance: Considering Stakeholder Interests, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CTR., http:// 
www.benefitcorp.net/for-directors/guidance-considering-stakeholder-interests (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2013). 
73 See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 839–42 (“This definition takes a holistic ap-
proach and is meant to be both comprehensive and flexible.”). 
74 See Deskins, supra note 2, at 1061. 
75 See Munch, supra note 6, at 184. 
76 See Benefit Corp Legislation, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/publicpolicy 
(accessed by searching the Internet Archive Index for Oct. 3, 2012) (“Both are sometimes 
called B Corps. They share much in common and have a few important differences. Certified 
B Corporation is a certification conferred by the non-profit B Lab. Benefit corporation is 
a legal status administered by the state. Benefit corporations do NOT need to be certified. 
Certified B Corporations have been certified as having met a high standard of overall so-
cial and environmental performance, and as a result have access to a portfolio of services 
and support from B Lab that benefit corporations do not.”). 
77 See Emily Chan, What It Means to Be a “B”: B Corp v. Benefit Corporation, LAW 
FOR CHANGE BLOG (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.lawforchange.org/NewsBot.asp?MODE 
=VIEW&ID=5220; Munch, supra note 6, at 182. 
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a benefit corporation’s, but without state legislation recognizing the entity, 
the articles of incorporation act more like a constituency statement akin to 
a contract with the shareholders.78 The state legislation creating the benefit 
corporation as a choice of entity recognizes the articles of incorporation as 
a contract with the state.79 State recognition as a legal form of entity pro-
vides the benefit corporation protection and certainty under its laws. 
A B Lab certified B Corp is not a recognized business entity existing 
under state law, but a certification.80 B Labs is a third-party certifier of 
benefit corporations and has spearheaded the effort to get states to adopt 
its model legislation.81 Any business can become certified as a B Corp by 
taking the “B Impact Test” and scoring a minimum of 80 out of 200 avail-
able points.82 The business must then “adopt the B Corporation Legal 
Framework to bake the mission of the company into its legal DNA,”83 
which is essentially “retrofitting”84 the corporation to include the stake-
holder model in its articles of incorporation. The B Corp must also “sign a 
Term Sheet and Declaration of Interdependence” to make the certification 
official.85 Each year, B Lab randomly selects ten percent of the current B 
Corps to audit and will adjust a B Corp’s score according to the audit, re-
moving its certification if it no longer qualifies.86 Certification of a B Corp 
is similar to certifications such as Fair Trade or LEED, and B Lab serves 
the same purpose as Transfair and USGBC respectively.87 Certification as 
a B Corp certainly adds legitimacy to the business’s socially conscious 
efforts in the eyes of investors and consumers. However, eliminating risk 
to directors through legitimacy under the law is essential for social entre-
preneurs to form these socially responsible businesses, even if certification 
will help skeptics find their intentions believable.88 Accordingly, although 
                                                 
78 See Chan, supra note 77; Munch, supra note 6, at 182. 
79 See Chan, supra note 77; Munch, supra note 6, at 182. 
80 See Benefit Corp Legislation, supra note 76. 
81 See The Benefit Corporation: A New Trend in Social Entrepreneurship, FIRST VENTURE 
LEGAL BLOG (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.firstventurelegal.com/the-benefit-corporation-a 
-new-trend-in-social-entrepreneurship/. 
82 See B Corp Certification Overview, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/Certification 
-Overview (accessed by searching the Internet Archive index for Oct. 3, 2012). 
83 Id. 
84 Munch, supra note 6, at 183. 
85 Make It Official, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become/official (accessed by 
searching the Internet Archive index for Oct. 3, 2012). 
86 Become a B Corp, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become/BRS (accessed by 
searching the Internet Archive for Oct. 3, 2012). 
87 See What Is a B Corp, supra note 7; Brewer, supra note 1, at 683. 
88 See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 824 (“[E]ntrepreneurs that are ‘sustainable,’ 
‘green,’ or ‘socially responsible’ may find that it is hard to distinguish themselves from 
other companies that make similar claims, but do not actually behave as they advertise.”). 
2013] BENEFIT EXPENSES 281 
the B Corp certification process adds accountability to those businesses 
that pass the test, a certified B Corp that does not live up to its purpose 
will lose its certification, while an incorporated benefit corporation that 
does not live up to its purpose could face legal consequences.89 
Only twelve states have enacted legislation creating benefit corpora-
tions as a separate legal entity. The first was Maryland in April of 2010.90 
Vermont, New Jersey, Virginia, Hawaii, California, New York, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina followed.91 Cal-
ifornia is of particular significance because, prior to this legislation, its law 
did not allow constituency statements or the creative, hybrid forms of busi-
ness used by the fourth sector to lessen the fiduciary duty in a manner that 
would allow directors to pursue non-profit-maximizing or socially orient-
ed purposes.92 This means that California law would enforce the profit-
maximization standard for fiduciary duty even if the corporation had in-
cluded a stakeholder model in its articles of incorporation.93 Additionally, 
California passed two separate legal entity forms, the Benefit Corporation 
and the Flexible Purpose Corporation (Flex C); the Benefit Corporation is 
incorporated for a general social purpose in addition to profit making, and 
the Flex C is incorporated for an additional specific social purpose.94 The 
model legislation for benefit corporations allows for an optional specific 
purpose in addition to the general purpose.95 The distinction between a 
general and specific purpose and how that might affect the tax treatment of 
the entity is discussed further. 
An example showing another difference between a certified B Corp 
and an incorporated benefit corporation is that the City of Philadelphia 
gave a sustainable business tax credit to Certified B Corps96 before it 
                                                 
89 See Chan, supra note 77. 
90 See Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, THE 
CORP. SOC. RESP. NEWSWIRE (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases 
/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation. 
91 See State by State Legislative Status, supra note 11. At the time of writing, there is 
also pending legislation in Washington, D.C. Id. 
92 See The New ABC’s of California Corporations, KAYE & MILLS, http://www.kayemills 
.com/articles/new-abcs-of-california-corporations.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
93 Id. 
94 Id.; see Sheila Shayon, California Law Creates New “Flexible Purpose” Category 
of Positive Impact Corporation, BRANDCHANNEL (Oct. 17, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://www 
.brandchannel.com/home/post/2011/10/17/California-Law-Creates-New-Category-of-Positive 
-Impact-Corporation.aspx. 
95 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(b) (2007). 
96 See Leslie Potter, First U.S. Sustainable-Business Tax Incentive, URBAN FARM, 
http://www.urbanfarmonline.com/sustainable-living/urban-community-building/philly-tax-in 
centives.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
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passed benefit corporation legislation. Therefore, as far as choice of entity 
is concerned, a B Corp could not file as a benefit corporation with the 
State of Pennsylvania and thus recognize the benefit of protection by its 
laws, but a B Corp would still have enjoyed some benefits based on its 
recognition as a certified business. 
States give businesses permission to operate and exist within a state’s 
borders.97 While there are model or uniform acts that often govern the de-
fault rules for the existence and operation of business entities such as part-
nerships, LLCs, and corporations, it is ultimately up to the state to decide 
the laws regarding choice of entity and those entities’ operations.98 By 
passing legislation that introduces the benefit corporation as a new choice 
of entity available for businesses in that state, benefit corporations are made 
a legal entity distinct from other corporations and a new area of law under 
which the new entity will operate is created. This is relevant because the 
state law in which the business is incorporated or registered under dictates 
what fiduciary laws apply, and that state’s law is also used to help deter-
mine what type of entity the business is for federal income tax purposes.99 
The fact that benefit corporations are a legally recognized entity for 
doing business under state law is not only important for understanding the 
significant role that they play in shifting the definition of business pur-
pose,100 but also for the arguments brought forth in this Note regarding the 
Code’s treatment of a benefit corporation. The policy and theoretical de-
bates over whether a corporation’s purpose inherently involves social re-
sponsibility, or whether it is strictly profit-maximizing, existed well before 
states began legitimizing benefit corporations in 2010.101 The debate that 
critics and advocates have over fiduciary duty is the same debate regard-
ing the allowance of charitable contributions.102 Although the support for 
benefit corporations reflects a desire to change the assumption that all cor-
porations are strictly profit-maximizing entities, it does not necessarily 
indicate that the change has occurred. In a way, benefit corporations create 
a refuge for corporations that want to escape the uncertainty of liability for 
their socially oriented, wealth-reducing activities, but the uncertainty still 
remains for non-benefit corporations. Benefit corporations legally shifted 
                                                 
97 See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 1:2 (3d ed. 2011). 
98 See id. § 3:2. 
99 See id. 
100 Munch, supra note 6, at 184 (“A new form would lend needed certainty and legiti-
macy to the benefit corporation project.”). 
101 See generally Knauer, supra note 52. 
102 See supra Part I. 
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their own purpose, but they have not necessarily shifted the theoretical 
view of corporations as a whole.103 In general, the questions that this Note 
addresses are whether having a state-incorporated social purpose removes 
the profit-maximizing assumption for benefit corporations in regard to fi-
duciary duty, and whether the removal of that assumption does, or should, 
have any effect on the Code’s view and treatment of benefit corporations. 
II. WHY INCORPORATED BENEFIT CORPORATIONS ARE A SPECIAL 
BLEND OF FOR-PROFIT AND NON-PROFIT 
Benefit corporations may be best examined under the Code by viewing 
benefit corporations as now having two dual purposes, one to make profits104 
and the other to serve social goals105 (for the purposes of this Note, “make 
benefit”), rather than as an adjustment of the definition of a corporation. 
This accurately demonstrates the hurdle presented by the Code over which 
the benefit corporation is currently straddled. Tax-exempt 501(c) and 501(d) 
organizations are exempt from federal income taxes based on whether they 
are organized and operated exclusively for one of the listed approved pur-
poses.106 Specifically, the exclusively organized test is met by examining 
the purposes listed in a corporation’s Articles of Organization.107 This cor-
relation between the importance of a non-profit’s incorporated purposes 
and the benefit corporation’s incorporated purposes is what makes the ben-
efit corporation more significant than constituency statements and Certified 
B Corps.108 While benefit corporations are not exclusively organized and 
operated for any of the listed purposes, B Corps now make it possible for a 
                                                 
103 For the remainder of this Note, where a shift in business purpose is discussed 
either as a trend or the legal change in purpose for Benefit Corporations, it is mostly used 
in reference to the fact that States are now allowing and legitimizing the option to have a 
social purpose. 
104 See Halle Tecco, Not For-Profit, Not Non-Profit, but Somewhere in Between, 
HUFFPOST IMPACT (Jan. 4, 2010, 7:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/halle-tecco 
/not-for-profit-not-non-pr_b_411117.html. 
105 See id. 
106 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b). 
107 See id. “An organization is not organized exclusively for one or more exempt 
purposes if its articles expressly empower it to carry on, otherwise than as an insubstan-
tial part of its activities, activities which are not in furtherance of one or more exempt 
purposes, even though such organization is, by the terms of such articles, created for a pur-
pose that is no broader than the purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).” § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(b)(2)(b)(iii). 
108 Even though certified B Corps must amend their articles to include a general pub-
lic benefit in order to be certified by B Labs, it is the state acknowledged and authorized 
aspect of the incorporated purpose that gives it more certain legal significance. See Legal 
Requirement, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become/legal (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
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tax-exempt approved purpose to be one of the state-recognized incorpo-
rated purposes of a taxable entity.109 The fact that B Corps now have ex-
plicit, although not exclusive, social purposes, and may be held liable for 
not acting in the interest of those purposes, raises questions regarding 
whether B Corps should receive the same, or similar, tax treatment as tax-
exempt entities. 
Benefit corporations have broken the rigid, single profit-seeking entity 
view for fiduciary duty and corporate law that has been evolving and 
growing over the years.110 The Code, however, has not undergone the same 
evolutionary process and remains quite rigid.111 The for-profit corporate 
law default rules and assumptions create an “unbridgeable chasm between 
for-profit enterprise and the charitable world,”112 and while that gap is 
filled for fiduciary duties in benefit corporations, “[e]verybody thinks with 
their brain in a left-right axis, and it’s divided by the tax code.”113 An entity 
is placed into its respective half of the Code according to the purpose for 
which that entity was organized.114 If the entity was organized and created 
to make money, then it is taxable.115 If the entity was organized for the pur-
pose of working toward a “social” mission, then it is tax-exempt.116 Benefit 
corporations challenge the Code’s current categorization of entities be-
cause they are legally recognized as being incorporated for both purposes. 
Tax preferences are not an explicit goal of benefit corporations, but it 
is something that representatives of B Labs117 and other fourth sector specu-
lators are hoping will happen one day.118 The new legislation passed by 
states has no impact on the tax status of the organizations.119 The Model 
                                                 
109 See In Defense of Tax Incentives: A Response to Diana Aviv, President Independent 
Sector, B Lab, http://blog.bcorporation.net/2010/06/in-defense-of-tax-incentives-a-response 
-to-diana-aviv-president-independent-sector/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
110 See Sugin, supra note 52, at 837. 
111 Id. 
112 Billitteri, supra note 14, at 7. 
113 Id. (comments of Mr. R. Todd Johnson). 
114 See Business Taxes, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self 
-Employed/Business-Taxes (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
115 See Corporations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self 
-Employed/Corporations (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
116 See Exemption Requirements-Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS, http://www.irs 
.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exemption-Requirements-Section 
-501%28c%29%283%29-Organizations (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
117 See Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 458; Jack B. Siegel, Esq., B Corporations: A 
New Form of Business Entity, or Just an Exercise in Branding?, 2011 Emerging Issues 
5757, 6 LEXISNEXIS (July 7, 2011); see also Billitteri, supra note 14, at 12. 
118 See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 355–58. 
119 See Business FAQ’s, supra note 8. 
2013] BENEFIT EXPENSES 285 
Legislation for benefit corporations cites to another subdivision under the 
same title that determines the applicable law for all matters not addressed 
in the chapter—applicable tax treatment, for example.120 This other subdi-
vision is usually the subdivision that determines general corporation law. 
The Code is so rigid in how it views the capacity of each side to “do 
good” that it only acknowledges “good” done by for-profits in the form of 
charitable contributions to IRS acknowledged tax-exempt entities.121 The 
donation must be to an organization the IRS has qualified as a “good doing” 
organization, or it will not be recognized as a charitable contribution.122 
While the Code is often used to incentivize or disincentivize behavior, and 
this is certainly the case with charitable contributions and at least some of 
the justification for tax-exempt status,123 non-profits are exempt from taxes 
for reasons other than the fact that the Code wants to cut them a break.124 
A. The Internal Revenue Code Favors Good Behavior and Taxes  
Profit-Motivated Income 
The Code ultimately makes the divide that qualifying non-profits will 
be exempt from federal income tax and for-profit corporations will have 
their income taxed.125 Tax-exempt status earns qualifying organizations 
exemption from federal income tax and some other taxes, but not all taxes.126 
Both non-profits and for-profits earn income, and in fact, both non-profits 
and for-profits may generate profits. The difference between the incomes 
and profits is seen when expanding non-profits to their full name: not-for-
profits. As mentioned, this reflects that the manner by which the Code cate-
gorizes taxable and tax-exempt entities is by their purposes.127 The income 
                                                 
120 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101(c) (2012). 
121 See Charitable Donation Tax Deductions, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://www.bbb 
.org/us/Charity-Tax-Deductions/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
122 See I.R.S. Publ’n 526, Charitable Contributions (2011), available at http://www 
.irs.gov/publications/p526/ar02.html#en_US_2011_publink1000229641. 
123 See Sweetened Charity, THE ECONOMIST (June 9, 2012), http://www.economist 
.com/node/21556570. 
124 See Terri Lynn Helge, The Taxation of Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI.–KENT 
L. REV. 883, 886 (2010). 
125 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
126 Tax Exempt & Government Entities Division At-a-Glance, IRS, http://www.irs 
.gov/uac/Tax-Exempt-&-Government-Entities-Division-At-a-Glance (last updated Sept. 5, 
2012) (tax exempt and government entities “[p]ay more than $220 billion in employment 
tax and income tax withholding”); see also Brewer, supra note 1, 694 nn.58–60 and 
accompanying text. 
127 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(2). 
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generated by tax-exempt entities is not intended to be profits,128 while the 
income generated by for-profit entities is intended to become profits.129 
The income that an exempt organization earns is assumed and required 
to be spent on serving the charitable purpose for which the entity was orga-
nized.130 Alternatively, the IRS views a for-profit corporation as a “profit-
maximizing” entity131 that generates income with the intent of retaining a 
portion of that income as profits to be distributed for the private benefit for 
its shareholders. Tax-exempt entities do not generate income for the pur-
pose of creating profits for private benefit or for generating profits at all 
(to the extent that they are inclined to spend all of their income that would 
be profits). A tax-exempt entity generates income to pay for the expenses 
necessary to provide a public benefit, and may lose its tax-exempt status if 
it distributes its income for a private benefit.132 
As a way to apply the federal income tax only to income motivated by 
the prospect of creating a profit (profit-motivated income), the Code defines 
and divides entities according to the entity’s intention, or reason, for gen-
erating income.133 Understanding what type of income the IRS wants to 
capture under the federal income tax is only one side of the story; there are 
also reasons the IRS wants to exempt a non-profit’s income (as opposed to a 
lack of desire to tax it).134 The IRS “wants” the non-profit to work toward 
its social mission, and taxing the income that it would otherwise spend on 
achieving that goal is counterproductive. The sector of the IRS that moni-
tors non-profits “is not designed to generate revenue, but rather to ensure 
that the entities fulfill the policy goals that their tax exemption was de-
signed to achieve.”135 The Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) is further 
evidence that the IRS wants to ensure that non-profits achieve their policy 
goals. The UBIT is a tax placed on income generated by a non-profit 
through activities that are unrelated to the non-profit’s stated purpose.136 
                                                 
128 See Non Profit Organizations, JUSTIA.COM, http://www.justia.com/business-formation 
/non-profit-organizations/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
129 See Joshua Kennon, Operating Income and Operating Profit Margin, ABOUT.COM, 
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This, together with the concept that the IRS chooses to capture profit-
motivated income, supports the notion that the IRS wants to encourage 
and incentivize “good” behavior, not just give preferential tax treatment to 
organizations based on their status or entity-categorization alone. 
III. BENEFICIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE CODE 
A. Tax-Exempt Status 
The Code divides qualified tax-exempt organizations into groups de-
termined by the purposes of the organization.137 The group of tax-exempt or-
ganizations most applicable to a discussion of tax treatment for benefit cor-
porations is the 501(c)(3) public charities because the purposes of the benefit 
corporation are closely related to the purposes allowed for 501(c)(3)s.138 
501(c)(3) public charities are also the most common 501(c) organization 
and account for fifty-nine percent of reporting tax-exempt organizations139 
and total more than 1.2 million organizations.140 The 501(c)(3)-listed pur-
poses are “religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, 
or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition ..., or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”141 
The “charitable” purpose has been interpreted broadly and will accommo-
date non-profits seeking tax-exempt status that do not fit the more specific 
purposes listed.142 A portion of the definition of “charity” includes: 
[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement 
of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance 
of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of 
Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed 
to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood 
tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend 
human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community 
deterioration and juvenile delinquency.143 
                                                 
137 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(1)–(29). 
138 See supra Part I. 
139 See Walker, supra note 23, at 628 (citing Kennard T. Wing et al., The Nonprofit 
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Many of these definitions of charity mirror the same type of activities as 
those considered for the general public benefit and specific public benefit 
in which benefit corporations must engage. 
B. Why Give Tax-Exempt Status 
The IRS website and its publications state in many places sentiments 
that there are strong policy reasons as to why tax-exempt organizations 
receive this tax preference. One of the reasons to give tax exemptions to 
501(c)(3) qualifying organizations is found in the Treasury Regulation de-
fining charity—“lessening of the burdens of [g]overnment.”144 
A more mechanical explanation is “income measurement theory,”145 
which argues that the individuals that the non-profits serve actually re-
ceive the income and that the non-profit is only a conduit through which 
the funds flow.146 Therefore, the non-profits do not have income to be 
taxed, and the charitable services or donations the non-profits make would 
be taxable income to their recipients. The income measurement theorists 
recognize the near impossibility of taxing these recipients who are often 
not known at the time the non-profit performs services or spends funds, 
and for this reason, it is simplest to avoid the problem by exempting quali-
fying non-profits from income tax.147 While avoidance might seem like a 
practical solution and not a theoretical reason, an argument can also be 
made that those who receive the actual benefit are typically indigent or in 
a tax bracket that would receive lesser tax obligations. 
As discussed before, the IRS is more interested in using taxation as a 
means to monitor non-profits and ensure that they are working toward 
their social purposes than it is in actually monitoring their taxation.148 Be-
cause a tax-exempt organization must be exclusively organized for a qualify-
ing purpose,149 once a non-profit attains tax-exempt status, the assumption 
will be that the organization is doing good.150 The IRS sets up limitations for 
the formation and structure of non-profits151 so that it is more likely that 
they will do “good,” but the IRS continues to monitor the organizations.152 
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145 Seong J. Kim, Note, Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil: A Guide to Non-Profit 
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C. Limitations Placed on Tax-Exempt Organizations 
1. Cannot Bestow Private Benefit 
One particularly important limitation placed on non-profits, and an 
important distinguishing feature between corporations and non-profits,153 
is that non-profits cannot create profit for a private benefit, or they could 
lose their exempt status.154 Corporations, including benefit corporations, 
distribute their profits to their shareholders. The requirement that non-
profits cannot give private benefit is so strong that if non-profits do give a 
private benefit, they could be subject to a punitive excise tax on the “excess 
benefit transaction.”155 The IRS imposes this tax as a sanction when the non-
profit gives a benefit to a party undesired by the IRS but the benefit bestowed 
is not so great as to disqualify the non-profit from its tax-exempt status.156 
Not only must they spend their income on their public purpose, but 
they must also earn their income in such a way that serves their public 
purpose.157 If they earn income in a manner that is more like a for-profit 
business, then they will be taxed on that income—even if they would have 
(or already have) spent that income on activities that serve their social pur-
pose.158 This is reflected in the fact that the two upmost qualifying attributes 
of an exempt organization159 are exclusive organization and exclusive op-
eration for one or more exempt purposes.160 This test can be quite strict.161 
2. Exclusively Organized 
A non-profit organization must be organized for one of the purposes 
listed by the IRS.162 For the exclusively organized test, the IRS will disqualify 
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person’ and, if a knowing, willful violation occurs, management.”). 
157 Walker, supra note 23, at 630–31 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2011)). 
158 See infra note 176 and accompanying text. 
159 Brewer, supra note 1, at 698–99. 
160 Walker, supra note 23, at 630–31; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (“In order to 
be exempt as an organization described in section 501(c)(3), an organization must be both 
organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in such 
section. If an organization fails to meet either the organizational test or the operational 
test, it is not exempt.”). 
161 See Brewer, supra note 1, at 698–702. 
162 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1). 
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the organization if “the terms of its articles [list] purposes for which such 
organization is created [that] are broader than the [charitable] purposes 
specified.”163 This means that if any non-exempt purpose is mentioned in 
its articles, it will not qualify as tax-exempt.164 Stricter still, the IRS says 
an organization with a purpose broader than the specified charitable pur-
pose will not meet the exclusively organized test even if “the actual opera-
tions of such an organization have been exclusively in furtherance” of the 
qualifying purposes, or if there is evidence or statements indicating the 
members intend to operate in such a manner.165 Furthermore, the incorpo-
rated purpose matters so much to receiving tax-exempt status that even if 
the non-profit is exclusively operated for an exempt purpose, and it just 
failed to file under that purpose, the entity will not be tax-exempt.166 
3. Exclusively Operated 
The exclusively operated test is less sensitive, and organizations will 
not necessarily lose their status for unrelated activity as long as the activity 
is not substantial.167 If the organization’s unrelated activity is not insub-
stantial then the organization will lose its exemption.168 The exclusively 
organized requirement is stricter but clearer. The substantially operated 
portion, however, is where much of the IRS monitoring will come in as it 
tries to determine what is “not insubstantial.”169 
D. Operational Activities of Tax-Exempt Entities 
1. Trade or Business 
Part of the operational testing is to ensure that the non-profit does 
not operate like a for-profit. If a tax-exempt entity does operate like a 
                                                 
163 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iv); see I.R.S., The Organizational Test Under 501(c)(3), Exempt 
Organization CPE Text (1985), at pt. 4, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc85.pdf. 
164 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i), -1(b)(1)(iii), -1(b)(1)(iv); see Better Bus. Bureau v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (“[T]he presence of a single non-exempt purpose, if 
substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance 
of truly ... [exempt] purposes.”); Mahon, supra note 14, 84 n.9. 
165 Supra note 163. 
166 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iv) to -1(b)(1)(v). I.R.S., The Organizational Test Under 
501(c)(3), Exempt Organization CPE Text (1985), at pts. 3–4, http://www.irs.gov/pub 
/irs-tege/eotopicc85.pdf. 
167 Kim, supra note 145, at 202. 
168 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (losing status “if more than an insubstantial part 
of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose”). 
169 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c). 
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for-profit—operating a trade or business170—then the trade or business 
must be in furtherance of the entity’s exempt purpose or purposes.171 In 
order to determine whether the activity falls under the definition of an unre-
lated trade or business in § 513172 to the extent that it would jeopardize the 
tax exemption on the income generated by that activity, the IRS applies a 
balancing test.173 The definition of trade or business is the same for the 
purposes of § 513 (unrelated trade or business), and § 162, which defines 
what constitutes a trade or business for a corporation.174 
In a discussion on the potential tax consequences to a tax-exempt orga-
nization of participating in an unrelated trade or business, one author wrote: 
The term “trade or business” generally includes any activity carried on for 
the production of income from the sale of goods or performance of ser-
vices. In evaluating this criterion, courts and the Internal Revenue Service 
consider whether the organization has a profit motive and whether the 
organization’s activity competes with that of for-profit enterprises. In 
determining whether a profit motive exists, significant weight is given to 
objective factors such as whether the activity is similar to profit-making 
activities conducted by commercial enterprises.175 
This concept—taxing the income of a non-profit when it generated that 
income by behaving like a for-profit—is referred to as Unrelated Business 
Income Tax (UBIT); the income received is referred to as Unrelated Business 
Income (UBI), and is taxable.176 UBIT is applicable when determining the 
tax treatment of behaviors that are not related to the non-profit’s purpose.177 
2. Unrelated Business Income Tax 
When a non-profit participates in business activities similar to for-
profits, such that they are operating in a trade or business, then the income 
                                                 
170 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) to -1(d)(1)(iii). 
171 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (stating that an otherwise exempt organization will not lose 
its exempt status if it “operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if 
the operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization’s exempt pur-
pose or purposes and if the organization is not organized or operated for the primary pur-
pose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business”). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (“In determining the existence or nonexistence of such primary purpose, all the cir-
cumstances must be considered, including the size and extent of the trade or business and the 
size and extent of the activities which are in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.”). 
174 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b). See infra Part VI.A. 
175 Helge, supra note 124, at 889 (citations omitted) (discussing 26 U.S.C. § 513(c) 
(2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (2006)). 
176 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a). 
177 See Brewer, supra note 1, at 873–75 nn.126–35 and accompanying text. 
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they receive from those activities will be taxed as UBI.178 The UBIT179 
regulations were enacted as part of an equalizing measure between non-
profits and for-profits to make sure non-profits did not have a tax-free advan-
tage on ordinary trade or business that is typically a profit driven activity 
rather than one satisfying its 501(c)(3) purpose.180 Income from an activity 
of the tax-exempt organization is considered unrelated and therefore taxa-
ble if it satisfies these three tests: “(i) the activity constitutes a ‘trade or 
business,’ (ii) the activity is ‘regularly carried on’ by the organization, and 
(iii) the conduct of the activity is ‘not substantially related to the perfor-
mance of the organization’s exempt function.’”181 To qualify as UBI, the 
activity must generally meet all of those requirements.182 For example, 
selling books is a trade or business,183 but if a non-profit sells books it is 
not necessarily taxed on the income generated.184 If the charitable purpose 
of the non-profit is to benefit the environment, then income generated 
from the sale of books will not be unrelated if the books are about saving 
the environment, but the income generated will be unrelated if the books 
are about, say, classical art.185 This demonstrates the balance of the Code 
to tax all profit-motivated income, unless it was generated in the pursuit of 
one of its approved social purposes. 
                                                 
178 26 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006). 
179 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (defining unrelated business taxable income as “the gross 
income derived by an organization from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried 
on by it .... Section 513 specifies with certain exceptions that the phrase unrelated trade 
or business means ... any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially 
related ... to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, 
educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under 
section 501 ....”). 
180 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (“The primary objective of adoption of the unrelated 
business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the 
unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as 
the nonexempt business endeavors with which they compete. On the other hand, where 
an activity does not possess the characteristics of a trade or business within the meaning 
of section 162 ..., the unrelated business income tax does not apply since the organization 
is not in competition with taxable organizations.”). 
181 Helge, supra note 124, at 897–98 (“There are other policies supporting the 
enforcement of the UBIT rules besides unfair competition; however, unfair competition is 
the most often touted.”). 
182 Id. at 897. 
183 Brewer, supra note 1, at 705 (explaining “[a] trade or business generally is defined 
as any activity carried on for the ‘production of income from the sale of goods or the 
performance of services’” (citing I.R.C. § 513(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b))). 
184 See id. at 706. 
185 Brewer, supra note 1, at 706. 
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3. Program-Related Investment 
Although not necessarily applicable to the 501(c)(3)s mainly discussed 
here, private foundations are allowed to partake in Program-Related In-
vestment (PRI),186 which is an investment of which the primary purpose 
“is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B), 
and no significant purpose of which is the production of income or the ap-
preciation of property.”187 As a private foundation participating in PRI, the 
foundation is making a grant-like investment in an organization or activity, 
but it is still receiving some returns.188 The other side of PRI is that “[i]f a 
private foundation invests any amount in such a manner as to jeopardize 
the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes,” then the IRS may impose 
a tax on that investment that varies between ten and twenty-five percent.189 
PRI is not often used because it takes a good deal of substantiation.190 
The IRS monitors PRI to make sure the private trust is engaging in the ac-
tivity that the IRS approves of and is doing so in a manner of which they 
also approve.191 The private foundation must engage in “expenditure re-
sponsibility.”192 This means that the private foundation must “see that the 
grant is spent solely for the purpose for which made”; “obtain full and 
complete reports from the grantee on how the funds are spent”; and give a 
detailed report on the expenditures to the IRS.193 PRI shows how the Code 
allows a non-profit to operate in a manner similar to a for-profit in a long-
term manner that supports the public benefiting purpose for which it was 
incorporated.194 The Code has allowed flexibilities for the realities facing 
tax-exempt entities and there are many characteristics of these provisions 
that could translate to benefit corporations. 
IV. THE CODE’S ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING FOR-PROFITS ARE 
TROUBLING FOR BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
After understanding how the Code identifies, treats, and monitors the 
behaviors of non-profits, and understanding how the Code treats “good” 
behavior differently from “profit-motivated” behavior, this Note now turns 
                                                 
186 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) (2011). 
187 Id. 
188 Brewer, supra note 1, at 712–13. 
189 26 U.S.C. § 4944(a)–(b) (2006). 
190 Brewer, supra note 1, at 712. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 712; Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(1) (2012). 
193 Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(1)(i) to -5(b)(1)(iii). 
194 See infra Part IV. 
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to the identification, treatment, and monitoring of both “good” and “profit-
motivated” behavior of for-profits. The Code appears to be unsatisfactorily 
designed to identify and treat the “good” behavior by benefit corporations. 
This Note will propose that the key to satisfactory tax treatment under the 
Code is to have a system designed to capture and deduct the expenses that a 
benefit corporation spends on creating its general or specific public purpose—
its benefit expenses. 
A. Charitable Contributions 
Currently the Code recognizes for-profits as being able to do good only 
by giving money to exempt organizations through charitable contribu-
tions.195 While charitable contributions have not always been an accepted 
activity of for-profits, the current approval of charitable contributions by 
corporations is reflected in the Model Business Corporation Act,196 com-
mon law,197 and the Code.198 While it might first seem that charitable con-
tributions are consistent with the benefit corporation’s goal to create public 
benefit, there are many aspects of charitable contributions that make them 
an unsatisfying vehicle for receiving favorable tax treatment for its efforts 
to create public benefit. 
The first complication arises with the requirements that a charitable con-
tribution be of a specific donative nature and that the contribution be made 
with gratuitous intent and not in return for substantial economic value.199 
To be deductible, a charitable contribution must be made as a gift, and not 
in exchange for an economic benefit.200 Some interpretations add the re-
quirement that the donor have no expectation of return benefit or that the 
contribution be made out of “detached and disinterested generosity.”201 All 
tests, at a minimum, require that the contribution not be given as a quid 
pro quo.202 This requirement is consistent with the Code’s way of catego-
rizing and taxing a transaction based upon the motivations behind it.203 
                                                 
195 See infra Part IV. 
196 See COX & HAZEN, supra note 97, at § 4:4 n.11 and accompanying text; Model 
Bus. Corp. Act § 3.02(13) (2007). 
197 COX & HAZEN, supra note 97, at § 4:4 nn.8–9 and accompanying text (citing A. P. 
Smith Mfg. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953)). 
198 Id. § 4:4 nn.15–16 and accompanying text. 
199 Sugin, supra note 52, at 837 n.5. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (2010). 
200 Sugin, supra note 52, at 846 (citing Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Comm’r, 380 F.2d 
146 (1st Cir. 1967); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971); DeJong v. 
Comm’r, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962)). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 846 n.55. 
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Usually, the Code determines the motivations of an entity’s behavior by 
starting with the correlating assumption for non-profits and for-profits. 
However, because benefit corporations are motivated by both profits and 
creating benefit, neither assumption leads to a clear and consistent treat-
ment of benefit corporations. After all, benefit corporations were created 
because this rigid binary structure was found to be inadequate.204 
The IRS views corporations as “profit-maximizing” entities205 and 
some view the recognition of charitable behavior by the Code as incon-
sistent with the assumptions placed on corporations in all other portions of 
the Code.206 The Code assumes that all activities of a corporation are in 
pursuit of profit-maximization goals, but then allows for a deduction for 
charitable contributions, only if the contributions were made without ex-
pecting anything (profits) in return.207 This is contradictory, and if the 
Code’s assumptions are correct, corporations will not make charitable con-
tributions because it would breach their fiduciary duty to maximize wealth 
for the shareholders and leave them vulnerable to ultra vires accusations. 
However, the laws do allow corporations to make charitable contributions 
without violating their fiduciary duty or facing ultra vires.208 Courts have 
liberalized their view of charitable contributions as ultra vires activities 
that are against the corporation’s duty to its shareholders.209 Some might 
argue that because courts stopped finding charitable contributions ultra 
vires, this is an indication that the purely profit-maximizing assumption is 
wrong or inadequate.210 As discussed previously, however, the legality of 
charitable contributions is an exception to the profit-motivated assump-
tion, not an indication of its lessening.211 
Another interpretation that comes to similar ends, but is actually sup-
portive of the profit-maximization assumption, is that charitable giving is 
in fact profit-maximizing (even if in the long run) for corporations, and 
                                                 
204 See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
205 Sugin, supra note 52, at 836. 
206 Id. at 836–37 (“In its treatment of corporate philanthropy, the Code adopts an 
anthropomorphic conception of the corporate entity that is at odds with the profit-
maximizing conception prevalent throughout the rest of the Code. It is also inconsistent 
with treating the corporation as an entity that is limited by its purposes and consequently 
not entitled to the rights and powers that humans possess.”). 
207 Id. at 846 n.55. 
208 See supra notes 195–97. 
209 COX & HAZEN, supra note 97 (“A pure gift of funds or property by a corporation 
not created for charitable purposes is generally unauthorized and in violation of the rights 
of its shareholders unless authorized by statute.” (citing Roger v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591–
92 (1933))). 
210 Knauer, supra note 52, at 20–22, 20 n.104. 
211 See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
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therefore not ultra vires to begin with. 212 There need not be any exception to 
ultra vires to legally allow charitable contributions because it is in the best 
financial interest of the shareholder.213 If one begins with the assumption 
that the managers and directors of a non-benefit, for-profit, corporation act 
in the best interest of the shareholders, one can conclude that although a 
charitable contribution might be immediately wealth-reducing, it will ul-
timately be profit-maximizing if it is in the long-term best interest of the 
company.214 Even before the creation of benefit corporations, some sug-
gested that another theory of corporate purpose falls under the “social re-
sponsibility model,” which assumes a broader “enlightened self-interest” 
purpose behind charitable giving and philanthropy.215 Again, this is still a 
somewhat troubling inconsistency in the Code because if corporations get 
something in return for doing good, then there is not the donative intent 
required to qualify for a deduction.216 
If charitable contributions must be given entirely as a gift with no return 
benefit for the benefit corporation, this will be almost impossible, espe-
cially given the fact that benefit corporations are now legally required to 
do socially responsible behavior such as give charitable contributions. For 
example, a valid specific purpose for a benefit corporation is “increasing 
the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose.”217 If that were 
a benefit corporation’s incorporated purpose, it would clearly be receiving 
some sort of benefit by making charitable contributions, if only by avoiding 
legal liability for failure to do so. It is because benefit corporations serve 
two purposes, and simultaneously, through the same action, show that 
economic and social benefit are not mutually exclusive,218 that they seem 
unfit for the charitable contribution provisions. 
                                                 
212 See, e.g., Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 463–64 (discussing Bill Gates’s concept of 
“creative capitalism” where “activities that benefit a social good, would make up for any 
lost profits by driving up stock prices—through enhanced corporate reputation—and 
increasing human capital—through attracting higher quality employees”). 
213 Id. 
214 Sugin, supra note 52, at 858–59. 
215 Knauer, supra note 52, at 20 (“If the goal of a corporation is to maximize 
shareholder profit and gain, then a corporate ‘gift’ must advance that end. On the other 
hand, if a corporation has responsibilities to constituencies beyond its shareholders (or to 
society at large), then a corporate ‘gift’ must address these responsibilities.”). Id. at 9–10 
(“Because corporate giving is inherently self-interested, a corporate transfer to charity 
cannot qualify as a ‘contribution or gift’ under section 170. This notwithstanding, each 
year corporations deduct billions of dollars under section 170.”). 
216 See infra Part IV.B. 
217 Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 841 n.107 and accompanying text. 
218 Business FAQ’s, supra note 8. 
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B. Goodwill 
One suggestion to fixing this “donative intent” problem is to reclassify 
charitable contributions as purchases of goodwill.219 Classifying charitable 
contributions as a purchase of goodwill220 would also prevent the govern-
ment from subsidizing the purchase of goodwill disguised as charitable 
contributions.221 An overarching difficulty of this interpretation is that 
goodwill is an asset,222 and it seems difficult to imagine that benefit ex-
penses will directly result in a goodwill asset of that amount of value, let 
alone that it will result in valuable goodwill at all. 
One problem with classifying the expenses that benefit corporations 
use to create “benefit” as purchases of goodwill is that the benefit corpora-
tion does not necessarily expect higher profits, or any financial return on that 
spending. It is more accurate to say they receive a goodwill “halo effect” 
from their status as a benefit corporation, not truly from their activities as a 
benefit corporation beyond the fact that they have to do those activities in 
order to keep their status.223 B Lab openly states that a perk of becoming a 
benefit corporation is the connotation the label will pass on to the public.224 
Benefit corporations have to pass the test to wear a real halo in order to 
receive its effects.225 
V. CURRENT TREATMENT OF GOOD BEHAVIOR BY FOR-PROFITS 
An understanding of the complications facing benefit corporations, 
due to the fact that it is difficult to classify and discern the nature and mo-
tivations behind the benefit corporation’s behavior, will help understand 
the discussion on for-profits acting “good” that follows. 
A. Charitable Contributions 
Businesses can currently take deductions for charitable contributions.226 
To qualify as a charitable contribution, certain criteria must be met regarding 
                                                 
219 Knauer, supra note 52, at 9. 
220 47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 152 nn.4–5 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2). 
221 Knauer, supra note 52, at 10. 
222 See id. at 7. 
223 Id. at 6–7, 9–10. 
224 Benefits of Becoming a B Corp, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/why_become 
_a_B (accessed by searching the Internet Archive index for Aug. 21, 2012). 
225 Declaration of Interdependence, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/declaration 
(accessed by searching the Internet Archive index for Oct. 5, 2012). 
226 26 U.S.C.A. § 170 (2010). 
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who receives the charitable contribution227 and the nature of the contribu-
tion (both intent and form).228 The Code also requires that the contribution 
be substantiated.229 
1. Qualifying Donee 
To be deductible, the charitable contribution must be given to an entity 
qualified to receive charitable contributions according to § 170(c).230 Gen-
erally speaking, this means a 501(c)(3) organization, charity,231 or govern-
ment unit.232 Examples of § 170–permitted charitable contribution recipients 
include: government entities, domestic charitable organizations, veterans’ 
organizations, domestic fraternal societies, and cemetery companies.233 If the 
organization is not listed under § 170(c), then contributions to the organiza-
tions are not tax deductible. This includes most social welfare organizations,234 
labor organizations,235 business leagues and chambers of commerce,236 and 
home owners associations.237 Additionally, for a charitable contribution to 
be tax deductible, it must be given to a domestic organization.238 
One of the reasons that charitable contribution deductions will not en-
able a benefit corporation to deduct all of its benefit expenses is because 
the recipient of the donation will not always qualify under § 170(c).239 
Where a stakeholder is as broad as “the community,” and the benefit corpo-
ration chooses to spend money directly on the community instead of fun-
neling it through a non-profit, it might even be difficult to determine who 
is the recipient of the benefit. This difficulty also supports the rationale for 
                                                 
227 Id. 
228 See supra Part IV. 
229 26 U.S.C.A. § 170(f)(8) (2010). 
230 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING 
TO THE FED. TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS, 6 (2011) (scheduled for a 
Public Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance on October 18, 2011) [hereinafter 
COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
231 See supra Part III.A. 
232 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 230, at 1. In 2010, one third of charitable contri-
butions were given to religious organizations. Id. 
233 26 U.S.C. § 170(c). Exempt Organizations Select Check, IRS, http://www.irs.gov 
/Charities–&–Non–Profits/Exempt–Organizations–Select–Check (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) 
(listing all organizations that have registered as tax-exempt, although it is not a complete list). 
234 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4) (2012). 
235 § 1.501(c)(5). 
236 § 1.501(c)(6). 
237 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 230, at 10. 
238 § 170(c)(2)(A). 
239 Id. 
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tax exemption for non-profits.240 Cutting out the requirement to have a 
non-profit middleman for funneling funds through could raise the overall 
efficiency of benefit creation, especially when considering the similarities 
of the “community” stakeholder and some of the example definitions of 
charity such as “combat community deterioration,” “relief of the poor and 
distressed or of the underprivileged.”241 Additionally, the hope is that bene-
fit corporations’ stakeholders will include those overseas as well as those 
located domestically and assumedly, then, some of the benefit activities of 
the benefit corporation would be directed towards foreign locations.242 
This would seem particularly true since a typical concern in social respon-
sibility programs is a sustainable and ethical supply chain, and many goods 
are manufactured abroad. Under the current law for charitable deductions, 
the money spent creating benefit overseas will likely not qualify as a de-
duction because a qualifying donee must be a domestic organization. 
2. Form—Must Be Cash or Cash-Equivalent 
The contribution must be in the form of either property or money. 
Contributions of services are not deductible.243 If the contribution is prop-
erty, then the company must donate the entire interest in that property.244 
While all benefit expenses will have to be valued, quantified, and corre-
spond with real financial cost, it is unlikely that a benefit corporation will 
satisfactorily serve its public benefit by simply writing checks. There are 
occasions where for-profits and non-profits join together, and the for-
profit is actively involved beyond writing a check and the charitable con-
tribution is still valid.245 One limitation on form, that if applied to benefit 
corporations might fail to capture the good created, is that a company do-
nating property must donate its entire interest.246 
3. Good Behavior Beyond Writing Checks 
For-profits and non-profits pair up together to leverage the attributes of 
the other and to create some social benefit.247 This is an example of how 
                                                 
240 See supra Part III. 
241 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). See supra Part III.A. 
242 Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 461 (stating that “U.S. corporations donated $7.7 
billion to developing countries” in 2008). 
243 26 U.S.C. § 170. 
244 Id. 
245 See infra Part V.A.3. 
246 26 U.S.C. § 170 (f)(3). 
247 Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 467. 
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difficult it might be to discern and qualify donative intent. For-profits do 
engage in activities with non-profits, such as marketing campaigns, that 
clearly create profit while still doing social good. Any corporation can en-
gage in mixed activities, such as an apparel company selling special shirts 
with a non-profit’s logo and, in turn, donating a certain percentage of the 
proceeds to that non-profit. 
4. Balancing Test 
There are many different instances where a mixed behavior activity 
could occur. One, like the profit-sharing example above, is a form of 
cause-related marketing.248 Here, a for-profit will use the logo and name of 
a non-profit to help sell an item, hopefully create goodwill (or, more accu-
rately, borrow the goodwill of the non-profit), and boost the overall profits 
of the company.249 Because the for-profit gets these perks in return, the per-
centage of profits given to the non-profit act more as an investment than a 
donation. On the reverse side, it is as if the non-profit has lent its assets 
(name and goodwill) to a for-profit and received a fee for its service—a 
service that does not support its charitable purpose (selling clothing). The 
non-profit does, in return, get marketing and exposure that might help 
raise awareness and benefit its cause. The concern is that this activity will 
be marketed as good behavior deserving favorable tax treatment, but in 
actuality it will be more profit-motivated. One suggestion is that the test to 
determine whether this activity can receive any favorable tax treatment is 
to “ensur[e] that the private benefit to the corporate partner is not substan-
tial in comparison to the benefit the charity receives.”250 
An example of a mixed behavior where there is a clear divide between 
the “good” and self-interested behavior is purchasing seats at a charity 
dinner.251 The concern for the business is that in order to deduct a charitable 
contribution, the donor must receive nothing in return and in this example 
                                                 
248 Helge, supra note 124, at 885–86. 
249 Id. (“But when the for-profit corporation also receives, in return for its support of 
the charity, the right to use the name or logo of the charity to directly affect the sale of the 
corporation’s product, the corporate sponsorship has morphed into cause-related market-
ing. Cause-related marketing is a more ‘direct effort to sell the [corporation’s] products or 
services by capitalizing on the public’s desire to leverage their dollars: consumers can 
buy a product and support a good cause at the same time.’ By engaging in cause-related 
marketing, ‘the corporation expects its sponsorship dollars to yield a measurable return 
not just in terms of public image and goodwill, but product sales as well.’”). 
250 Id. at 953. 
251 John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions 
Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 657, 663 (2001). 
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the donor is receiving a meal. The IRS has issued a Revenue Ruling252 that 
held that the deductible amount is the “excess of the fair market value of the 
return.”253 If a business purchases seats at a charity dinner for fifty dollars 
each and the tickets have a fair market value of twenty dollars, then the 
business will be able to deduct the difference of thirty dollars. The reason 
for this is that this amount has no reciprocal benefit to the donor-business 
(it is as if the business purchased the seats at the fair market value of twenty 
dollars and then wrote a separate check for thirty dollars). In profit-sharing 
models between for-profits and non-profits, the profit-motivated behavior 
of selling apparel risks tainting the preferential tax treatment that would 
have been given to purely good behavior. The non-profit may risk losing 
tax exemption on the donated share of profits due to the fact that it is gener-
ated from unrelated business activities (in some respects, leasing its good-
will).254 The for-profit risks the deduction for a charitable contribution due 
to the fact that they are receiving a direct benefit (the percentage of the 
profits they are not donating) in return for their contribution. If the non-
profit were to do it themselves, not only would it probably cost more, but it 
could trigger the UBIT, and lead to disqualification of the exempt status.255 
Even if a benefit corporation objectively creates enough public benefit 
to qualify an activity as a charitable contribution under a balancing test, 
the donative intent requirement may otherwise limit its qualification. In 
Transamerica Corp. v. United States,256 a corporation was denied the clas-
sification of a charitable contribution for the expenses spent on the con-
struction of a road it built for the City of Oakland.257 The court found that 
by nature of the road being located close to its building location, the cor-
poration intended to receive some benefit from the road’s construction and 
it did not meet the donative intent requirements.258 To qualify as a § 170 
deduction, the court ruled that a contribution must be that of “detached 
and disinterested generosity” or that of “affection, respect, admiration, 
                                                 
252 Id. at 663; see Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. 
253 Colombo, supra note 251, at 663. 
254 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (2006). 
255 § 1.501(c)(3). 
256 254 F. Supp. 504, 514–15 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff’d, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968). 
257 Id. 
258 Id. After the § 170 deduction was denied, Transamerica argued that the expense 
should be classified as a § 162(a) deduction and the government argued that it should be 
capitalized because the benefit of the paved road will extend beyond one year. Id. Not 
only might it be complicated to quantify the amount of benefit a benefit corporation re-
ceives for a benefit-creating action, it may also be difficult to determine the length of 
time for which the benefit corporation receives that benefit. The length of time for which 
the benefit is considered to be enjoyed may impact the tax treatment of the expenses 
incurred in the activity. See infra notes 289–91 and accompanying text. 
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charity or like impulses.”259 The paved road would benefit the City of 
Oakland and the general community, both by providing the community 
with the use of the paved road as well as alleviating the city from spending 
the tax money it would have had to spend to pave the road itself.260 The 
company’s involvement in building the road appeared to fall under some of 
the definitions of “charity” included in the Treasury Regulations such as 
“erection or maintenance of public ... works” and, “lessening of the burdens 
of Government.”261 This focus on the subjective intent of the activity in-
stead of the overall benefit created by the activity may restrict the applica-
bility of charitable contributions to many benefit corporations’ activities. 
This crossover of a for-profit performing activities for a tax-exempt 
purpose lends itself well to the similar analysis undertaken in determining 
the application of UBIT or PRI to tax-exempt organizations engaging in 
profit-motivated behavior—both to determine if the behavior is related to 
the public purpose and to what degree the behavior is intended to meet 
that public purpose.262 
VI. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION COMPARED TO OTHER 
DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSES 
Viewing charitable contributions as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses reconciles some of the problems with trying to apply the model 
for deductions for charitable contributions to benefit expenses. Even with-
out the incorporated general or specific public benefit purpose, some 
fourth sector advocates argue that by allowing for good behavior like char-
itable deductions, the Code legitimizes managers’ choice to make corpo-
rate philanthropy “part of the corporation’s trade or business, despite the 
fact that they are allowed to be wealth-reducing for the corporation.”263 In 
other words, philanthropic behavior by corporations is so common that its 
expenditures could be considered the same as any other incurred by a cor-
poration in its ordinary course of operation and deductible as such. 
A. Ordinary and Necessary 
Corporations are able to deduct under § 162 “all the ordinary and nec-
essary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any 
                                                 
259 Id. at 515 (quoting Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); DeJong v. Comm’r, 
309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962)). 
260 Id. 
261 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). 
262 § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). 
263 Sugin, supra note 52, at 858. 
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trade or business.”264 For a deduction to be allowable as a trade or busi-
ness expense under § 162 it must be ordinary and necessary.265 This provi-
sion by the IRS supports the idea that the purpose of taxation is to tax only 
profit-motivated income.266 This is because the taxpayer is allowed to de-
duct the expenses that are incurred while producing profits—the Code 
matches expenses with income.267 The income left not matched with a de-
ductible expense is profit and is taxed.268 While trade or business is typi-
cally defined as profit-motivated behavior, this is not applicable for benefit 
corporations, which in some ways have created a new trade or business. 
For an expense to be considered ordinary, it does not have to happen 
regularly during the lifetime of the business, or be an expense that will occur 
in all trades or businesses.269 The goal of this requirement is not to discour-
age or penalize odd, quirky ways to run a business. 
For an expense to be considered necessary, it does not have to be abso-
lutely indispensible to achieving the goals of the trade or business.270 The 
expense must just be “appropriate and helpful.”271 There is also allowance 
for the differences in business judgment of activities that will help achieve 
the trade or business.272 
To understand how charitable contributions could be considered ordi-
nary and necessary for all businesses, it might be appropriate to view the ten 
percent cap on charitable deductions as the feature that single handedly 
makes this possible.273 Applying the relevant theories when non-profits 
                                                 
264 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012). 
265 Jefferson Mills, Inc. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 305, 313–14 (N.D. Ga. 1965), aff’d, 
367 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1966) (citing Campbell v. Fields, 229 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1956)). 
266 Rev. Rul. 81-69, 1981-1 C.B. 351. 
267 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012). 
268 Id. 
269 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES 
AND GIFTS ¶ 20.3.2 (1999) (citing Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1940) 
(“Ordinary has the connotation of normal, usual, or customary. To be sure, an expense may 
be ordinary though it happens but once in the taxpayer’s lifetime .... Yet the transaction 
which gives rise to it must be of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business 
involved .... [T]he fact that a particular expense would be an ordinary or common one in 
the course of one business and so deductible under [§ 162] does not necessarily make it 
such in connection with another business .... One of the extremely relevant circumstances 
is the nature and scope of the particular business out of which the expense in question 
accrued. The fact that an obligation to pay has arisen is not sufficient. It is the kind of 
transaction out of which the obligation arose and its normalcy in the particular business 
which are crucial and controlling.”)). 
270 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933). 
271 Id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)). 
272 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 269, at ¶ 20.3.2. 
273 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2012). 
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participate in a trade or business, the ten percent cap ensures that the 
wealth-reducing behavior does not become “not insubstantial.” Viewing 
the ten percent cap as a means to keep corporate donation within a scale 
that is ordinary and necessary of generally profit-maximizing businesses is 
also consistent with fiduciary duty views.274 For example, directors re-
ceive vast amounts of deference—the business judgment rule—for deter-
mining whether the day-to-day decision-making was in the best interest of 
the company.275 The ten percent cap almost guarantees that the company 
will not donate so much money so as to possibly start serving a public 
benefit at a financial cost to the shareholders.276 This is similar to the non-
profit standards that disallow a tax benefit for activities routinely engaged 
in by the non-profit that are unrelated to its exempt purpose. 
Viewing charitable contributions as common still renders some incon-
sistencies under the Code. The conclusion that philanthropic behavior is so 
commonplace that it is “ordinary and necessary” under § 162277 conflicts 
with the Code’s disallowance of deductions under § 162 that would oth-
erwise have been deductible under § 170 if it were not for the ten percent 
cap on deductions.278 The solution for benefit corporations then, might be 
to get rid of § 170 charitable contributions and their ten percent cap and 
view all benefit expenses as ordinary and necessary to the trade or busi-
ness of being a benefit corporation. Allowing the directors of a benefit 
corporation to exercise judgment that reduces shareholder wealth in order 
to serve its social purpose is exactly the type of behavior that benefit cor-
porations intend to make ordinary and necessary.279 Directors of benefit 
corporations open themselves up to liability for not doing good, because to 
act contrary to their state-incorporated general and/or specific public pur-
pose would now be considered ultra vires.280 
                                                 
274 See Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 834–38. 
275 Id. (“[C]ourts reviewing decisions made in the day-to-day context will not question 
rational judgments about how seemingly promoting non-shareholder interests (such as a 
corporation’s decision to make charitable contributions or to otherwise support the com-
munity in which their operations are located) ultimately promote shareholder value.”). 
276 Id. 
277 Sugin, supra note 52, at 854–55. 
278 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1988). 
279 Clark & Babson, supra note 1, at 835 (“While it is not true that all decisions that re-
flect consideration of non-shareholder interests lead to a reduction in shareholder value ... 
it is equally true that some might lead to reduced shareholder value, even over the long 
term .... [S]ome mission-driven business executives and investors may be comfortable 
with that result in the pursuit of their social mission”). 
280 Sugin, supra note 52, at 854. 
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Viewing both profit-motivated behavior and socially motivated behav-
ior as ordinary and necessary to a benefit corporation adequately reflects 
and captures the Benefit Expenses that it will incur throughout its life. 
Benefit corporations would not have to worry about funneling all of their 
charitable behavior through a qualified non-profit, or by creating their own 
in-house non-profit. Google has responded in this way by creating a non-
profit entity, Google.org, through which the for-profit entity Google.com 
can channel its philanthropic efforts.281 Some for-profits have set up related 
non-profits and funnel money through those entities.282 It is likely that 
larger non-profits, like Google, will never become benefit corporations 
because it might be difficult for them to find the mass of like-minded in-
vestors and shareholders that wish to spend their money on socially ori-
ented businesses that might produce lower profit margins.283 However, by 
allowing benefit expenses to be defined as ordinary and necessary, the di-
rectors of the likely private and closely held stock corporations that wish 
to become benefit corporations will have more flexibility and control over 
serving that social purpose. Additionally, the directors will not be con-
strained by the degree to which they do so, or by having to rely on a related 
non-profit to create the benefit as a conduit. 
One possible complication with treating benefit expenses as ordinary 
and necessary is that assets that have a useful life that extends beyond the 
calendar year must be capitalized.284 The complication raised by this point 
is similar to those seen with defining the social benefit created by non-
profits—who is the recipient?285 Benefit expenses would be expenses used 
toward furthering the specific or general public purpose, and not private 
purposes, and the benefit corporation would not actually receive an asset 
for which it could capitalize.286 Because the purpose and motivation of 
benefit expenses is similar to charitable donations, and charitable dona-
tions are fully deductible in the year that they are made, a good argument 
could be made that benefit expenses could also be fully deductible in the 
year that they are made. Deducting all of the benefit expenses in the year 
in which they were made would likely be favorable to the corporation, as 
taxpayers typically prefer to deduct expenses in the earliest year possible. 
                                                 
281 Schoenjahn, supra note 15, at 460, 468–69. 
282 See id. at 459–60. 
283 See, e.g., S.B. 79—A, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011). 
284 26 U.S.C. § 263A (2012). 
285 See supra Part III. 
286 In Transamerica Corp. v. United States, the corporation was considered to be the 
recipient of the benefit and the court determined that because the road had a useful life 
beyond one year the corporation was a required to capitalize the expense. Transamerica 
Corp., 254 F. Supp. 504, 515 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff’d, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968). 
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VII. SUBSTANTIATION 
It is easy to imagine criticism arguing that a deduction for “good be-
havior” as an ordinary and necessary benefit expense, and which rests in 
part on the deference to the directors, may be too easily taken advantage of 
and benefit corporations could deduct all expenses, including those that do 
not actually create real social benefit. This is the same concern that dic-
tates the substantiation of charitable contributions.287 A written record 
must be kept of the charitable deduction that lists the name of the donee 
organization, the value of the contribution, and the date contributed.288 If 
the contribution is noncash property and is more than $500, then the sub-
stantiation must include a form that qualifies the contribution with the tax-
payer’s return.289 Substantiation also plays a key role in the balancing test 
when considering the private and public balance of UBIT and PRI, which 
is required to be substantiated and monitored in order to meet the expendi-
ture responsibility requirements.290 Like substantiation for many activities 
under the Code, each of these situations is based on the specific facts at 
hand,291 and this may add to the number of transactions the IRS must mon-
itor and enforce. 
The non-profit sector has received similar criticism regarding organi-
zations abusing the tax benefits given to it by the Code.292 The IRS has 
requested increased accountability, transparency, and good governance 
from non-profit organizations293—the same increased standards that bene-
fit corporations choose to meet.294 Fortunately for the IRS, benefit corpora-
tions are monitored by a third party and also must issue an annual Benefit 
Report stating all of the benefit activities it has done that year.295 While 
the monitoring third party might not audit every benefit corporation it 
monitors each year it likely performs regular audits and keeps reports for 
each benefit corporation, such as B Labs does.296 This extra set of eyes 
                                                 
287 See, e.g., Mark L. Levine, Appraisal Requirements Charitable Contribution De-
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and substantiation will help ensure that the expenses incurred by benefit 
corporations are actually creating real social benefit. This motivation to 
create real social impact and not just ineffective and exaggerated market-
ing of social responsibility is the main mission of B Labs,297 and having 
that label will help ensure that deductions for benefit expenses are actually 
going to create social and public benefit as the IRS intends by its favorable 
treatment. This is similar to an exempt organization status providing that 
entity with the assumption that their activities will be for social good, and 
that the activities of a for-profit are for generating profits. Benefit corpora-
tions may at least be granted the rebuttable presumption that the Code cur-
rently fails to give other for-profits. 
VIII. FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES 
As briefly mentioned earlier,298 benefit corporations are allowed to 
adopt a specific public purpose in addition to the general public purpose, 
such as California’s Flexible Purpose Corporations (FlexC).299 The general 
public purpose is the broader stakeholder model of benefit corporations300 
and the specific purpose is one that would otherwise qualify as an exempt 
purpose.301 If a FlexC were to adopt a special purpose that was same as an 
exempt purpose under 501(c)(3), the “good behavior” engaged in by the 
FlexC will even more closely resemble the “good behavior” to which the 
IRS gives favorable tax treatment. The FlexC legislation explicitly allows 
for a corporation to be involved in the mixed behavior activities previously 
discussed,302 which another corporation would have had to funnel through a 
non-profit with the FlexC’s equivalent specific exempt purpose.303 Allowing 
benefit expenses only for those benefit corporations that elect a specific 
purpose may help put those skeptical of benefit corporations a bit more at 
                                                 
297 Why B Corps Matter, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/why-b 
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ease. For substantiation purposes, it will be easier to classify and identify 
whether the expense was related to that specific purpose. For those that 
are skeptical about the capability of for-profit corporations to create real 
social benefit and not just engage in social-washing, this might be a more 
appealing, and limiting, option. A more specific purpose would assumedly 
better lend itself to transparency and substantiation, and also result in fewer 
tax deductions. 
CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, benefit corporations challenge the existing concept of 
profit-maximizing corporations. Because benefit corporations clearly remove 
themselves from the confusion by getting states to legitimize their dual 
purpose, the treatment of benefit corporations in many areas of corporate 
law may begin to see the same change originally intended for fiduciary 
duty. Treatment by the Code is no exception. Benefit corporations legiti-
mize the fourth sector and the Code must accommodate its entrance into 
state legislation. The Code repeatedly looks to the purpose and intent of 
transactions in order to determine their treatment, and it treats activities 
that legitimately benefit society favorably. Benefit corporations are a new 
class of corporation, which earn their entity status by participating in the 
same socially responsible activities as a tax-exempt organization, and plan-
ning to do so on a regular basis. This regular use of benefit expenses can be 
viewed as ordinary and necessary to the trade or business of benefit corpo-
rations, especially as advocates such as B Labs continue to fight so hard to 
change the corporate law view of business purpose so that it includes cre-
ating public benefit as ordinary and necessary for all corporations. 
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